Northern Nigeria is currently under siege from a network of armed groups that blend local

Banditry with foreign jihadist tactics.

States including Sokoto, Kwara, Kebbi, Katsina, Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kogi, and Niger have been severely affected, with communities facing kidnappings, raids, extortion, and violent attacks.

Investigations by Sunday Vanguard revealed that local bandits have absorbed foreign fighters fleeing instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, resulting in more coordinated and lethal operations.

Unlike highly structured terror organisations such as ISWAP and Boko Haram, Sunday Vanguard gathered that these networks operate fluidly. They are often identified by kingpins, forest bases, tribal affiliations, or the corridors they control. Groups such as Lakurawa and Mahmuda are prominent, but hundreds of smaller cells operate in secrecy, shifting leadership when commanders are neutralized.

This adaptability allows attacks across states without easily traceable patterns. Sunday Vanguard conducted a detailed investigation into these armed groups, their modus operandi, motives, and the human impact of their operations.

Herdsmen, Lakurawa Jihadists

Since 2017, Sokoto State has become a hotspot of banditry and ideological terrorism. The state hosts two main armed actors: local Fulani bandits and foreign-linked Lakurawa jihadists.

Fulani bandits are largely profit-driven, targeting livestock, farmers, traders, and pastoralists. They operate in small cells, moving rapidly on motorcycles and using forested areas such as Gundumi and Tureta as hideouts. Attacks typically occur at night, focusing on ransoms, theft, and intimidation.

Villagers describe sudden raids where bandits abduct families, demand large sums, and often return after collecting ransom to plan further attacks.

The Lakurawa jihadists, reportedly fleeing Mali, operate with ideological motives. Their stated objective is to enforce strict Shari’a laws, recruit local youths, and establish mini-caliphates.

They set up forest camps in Gongono (Tangaza and Gudu LGAs) and travel in motorcycle convoys for rapid raids. These jihadists engage in public punishments, forced prayers, and selective targeting of community leaders resistant to their control.

Residents describe constant fear. A trader in Gudu said: “Every night we hear gunshots and motorcycles. People no longer sleep at home. We flee to the bush whenever we sense danger.” Another villager in Tangaza recalled: “Lakurawa came to our village, told us to pray five times a day, and burned houses of those who resisted. We have no choice but to obey.”

The overlapping presence of profit-driven bandits and ideological militants has paralyzed Sokoto’s rural communities. Villages are deserted at night, markets have collapsed, farmlands remain untended, and thousands have been displaced. Intelligence reports suggest that Lukerewa groups coordinate with foreign jihadists, exchanging information and weapons, which complicates military and police responses.

KADUNA: Criminal gangs, Ansaru-linked extremists

Kaduna State faces a combination of criminal gangs and Ansaru-affiliated extremist cells.

Criminal gangs in Kaduna focus on ransom kidnappings, cattle rustling, highway ambushes, and village raids. Loosely structured, these gangs are coordinated by local leaders controlling weapons and ransom collection. They exploit forested terrain to evade security forces and establish temporary camps to launch successive raids.

Ansaru-linked jihadists, meanwhile, pursue both ideological and financial objectives. They recruit youths from surrounding communities, enforce social rules, and attempt to expand their influence into remote forested areas. Their operations are well-organized, often targeting schools, trading posts, and illegal mining sites. Camps have been identified in Kuyello, Maganda, Gagumi, and Gayam, where militants not only abduct villagers but also fight over mining resources like gold and lithium.

A farmer in Birnin Gwari lamented: “We live in fear. Bandits come at night, take our children, burn our farms. We cannot go to our fields without security escort.” Another in Maganda said: “They are armed with rifles and move in dozens on motorcycles. The military tries, but they disappear into the forests before anyone can catch them.”

Recent incidents, including the Layin Danauta attack in Kuyello and confrontations in Manini, illustrate the ongoing security challenges despite military interventions. Analysts note that the combination of profit-driven gangs and ideologically motivated jihadists makes Kaduna a complex theater for counterinsurgency.

KANO: Spillover bandits

Kano communities bordering Katsina have experienced a spillover of bandit activity. Fulani bandits from Katsina use large motorcycle convoys to raid villages, rustle livestock, kidnap residents, and destroy property. LGAs most affected include Shanono (Faruruwa, Goron Dutse, Kuraku, Tsaure) and Tsanyanwa (Biresawa, Tsundu, Yanganau).

Local vigilantes collaborate with security forces, but poor roads and forested terrain hinder rapid response. Isyaku Umar, vice chairman of Faruruwa community security committee, said: “They come in over 100 motorcycles, three men per bike. We patrol, but the terrain makes it difficult.” Malam Abubakar of Tsanyanwa added: “Last attack, 10 people were kidnapped, including eight women. Roads are bad, so it took hours for help to arrive. People live in fear every day.”

Kano’s proximity to Katsina’s dense forested zones makes it a transit and operational corridor for these armed groups. The spillover has forced communities to adopt curfews, restrict movement, and rely heavily on vigilante networks for protection.

KWARA: Mahmuda, herdsmen, Nigerien bandits

Kwara State faces a mixture of threats from a splinter faction of the Mahmuda group, local Fulani herdsmen, and cross-border bandits from Niger. These armed actors exploit thick forests and remote rural areas in Baruten, Edu, Kaiama, and Patigi.

Mahmuda operatives pursue both ideological and financial motives. While some raids are designed to instill fear or enforce beliefs, the majority of attacks are profit-driven, focusing on kidnappings and ransoms. Bandits are well-armed and use terrain knowledge to surround and abduct villagers with little chance of escape.

A survivor of the CAC Oke-Isegun attack in Eruku said: “They killed three of our members and took 38 of us. They know the forest, they know their targets. Nobody can run.” Another resident of Isapa recalled: “The attack came without warning. People fled to the bush. We were warned not to escape, or they would shoot.”

Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq has deployed military bases and patrol units, equipping hunters with motorcycles to track bandits, but kidnappings and raids remain frequent, demonstrating the challenge of forest-based insurgency.

BENUE: Armed herdsmen

Benue’s fertile farmland has attracted armed herdsmen and local militias, many linked to the late warlord Terwase Agwaza’s network. They conduct coordinated night raids to seize farmland, impose curfews, and extort traders and farmers. These groups operate like parallel governments, controlling villages and punishing defiance with extreme violence.

Chief Iorbee Ihagh, Chairman of Benue Tribal Leaders, said: “The armed herdsmen attacking Benue have one mission: to kill, maim, rape, sack our people, and occupy the land. They send people to IDP camps. Moon Ward was sacked years ago. We cannot visit without heavy security.” A Ukum community leader added: “These boys operate as a government of their own. If you refuse to pay taxes or speak against them, you are gone. Even doing nothing wrong can be fatal.”

Thousands have been displaced, children remain out of school, and local economies are collapsed. Terrain, forest hideouts, and local informants make security operations extremely challenging.

KOGI: Herdsmen, local, transit bandits

Kogi State serves as a transit hub for criminals fleeing military pressure from Niger, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and the FCT. The main armed actors include local kidnap gangs (such as the Kabba-Bunu and Ofere gangs), armed robbers, and transit bandits who exploit the state’s forested corridors. They frequently target highways and rural communities, abducting victims for ransom and holding them in forest hideouts such as Oke-Onigbin, Masalaci-Boka, and Ofere.

In recent years, these gangs have increasingly targeted Yagba and other Yoruba-speaking areas of Kogi State bordering the Southwest. The main perpetrators are Yagba local bandit factions aligned with transit gangs from Nasarawa and Niger. They exploit the hilly and forested terrain, striking villages and towns along the A123 and adjoining rural roads. Their attacks often begin with night raids on isolated settlements, where armed men on motorcycles surround communities, block escape routes, and abduct traders, farmers, or commuters. Houses and shops are sometimes looted or burned to intimidate residents and force compliance with ransom demands.

A resident In Yagba East said: “They come in dozens at night, with rifles and machetes. They surround villages, pick people they want, and vanish into the bush. Some return after collecting ransom to strike elsewhere. Roads are bad, and we cannot rely on security to come in time.”

Security agencies have neutralized some camps, but attackers quickly regroup in thick forests along the Southwest border, taking advantage of poor surveillance, limited road access, and support from sympathizers. Villages live in fear, school attendance drops, local markets collapse, and residents often migrate temporarily to safer towns.

The gangs’ strategy combines fear, mobility, and intelligence. They gather information on household wealth, movements of travelers, and the timing of security patrols before striking. By targeting Yoruba-speaking areas along the Southwest border, they also exploit cross-state corridors, making Kogi both a destination and a transit hub for kidnapping, armed robbery, and extortion.

KEBBI: Migrating armed groups

Kebbi faces migrating armed groups from Zamfara, Sokoto, and Niger Republic. They operate alongside local criminal collaborators, establishing temporary camps in Zuru Emirate, Danko-Wasagu, Sakaba, Fakai, and Ngaski LGAs. Groups raid villages, ambush vehicles, impose levies on farmers, and abduct residents.

A farmer In Zuru lamented: “They demand levies before we can harvest. If we refuse, they burn farms and abduct people. We are trapped.” Military raids and airstrikes have disrupted some camps, but cross-border mobility allows armed groups to persist.

NIGER: Mahmuda factions, criminal gangs, and herdsmen

Niger State hosts Mahmuda factions, local criminal gangs, and armed herders operating in Shiroro, Rafi, Munya, Lapai, Paikoro, and Mariga. They raid farms, villages, mining sites, and highways, frequently using motorcycle convoys and dense forest hideouts to evade capture.

A local In Rafi said: “They come suddenly at night, take people and animals. We cannot farm or go to the market safely. Army comes, they disappear into the forest.” Despite military operations and airstrikes, groups regroup rapidly, making Niger one of the most persistent hotspots of insecurity.

KATSINA: Long-established bandits and herdsmen

Katsina hosts long-established bandit gangs, cattle rustling syndicates, and displaced herders from Zamfara and Kaduna. Operating from forests such as Rugu, Dajin Kogo, and Safana, they raid villages, abduct residents, extort farmers, and steal livestock. Areas affected include Jibia, Batsari, Safana, Danmusa, Faskari, Sabuwa, Kankara, and Dandume.

A local explained: “They control the forests and come out at night. Some villages are empty; people fled.” Security agencies conduct airstrikes and mobilize vigilantes, but the proximity to ungoverned forests ensures that risk remains high.

ZAMFARA: Herdsmen, Lakurawa, Mahmuda

Zamfara continues to be Nigeria’s most affected state. Lakurawa, Mahmuda, and local bandits operate in well-armed, coordinated squads, attacking villages at night and kidnapping hundreds for ransom. Forest belts provide operational cover, while alliances with foreign jihadists increase sophistication.

Residents report terror in communities like Maradun, Gusau, and Anka. Militants use motorcycles, firearms, and intelligence from sympathizers to strike swiftly and vanish.

Mass displacement and school closures have left children out of education, while farmlands are abandoned, compounding food insecurity.

Meanwhile across Sokoto, Kwara, Kebbi, Katsina, Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kogi, and Niger, Sunday Vanguard can authoritatively state that the network of Lakurawa, Mahmuda, local bandits, and armed herders has created a multifaceted security crisis. Their operations combine ideology, profit, and territorial control, exploiting forests, cross-border corridors, and weak law enforcement.

Addressing this crisis, many believe, requires intelligence-led operations, regional cooperation, community engagement, and socio-economic interventions to reduce the appeal of criminal networks.

Without decisive action, Northern Nigeria’s communities may remain trapped in fear, displacement, and economic collapse. (Sunday Vanguard, excluding headline)