By YECHALE DEGU

Placed within its historical context, Sudan is currently engulfed in an intra-governmental war of unprecedented scale, characterised by widespread destruction, mass displacement, and staggering loss of life surpassing even the conflicts associated with South Sudan’s independence struggle and the war in Darfur decades ago. On the ground, hostilities continue to intensify across multiple frontlines as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) escalate their campaigns to secure strategically vital territories. These efforts involve ground offensives, artillery barrages, drone strikes, and aerial bombardments, yet neither side has succeeded in establishing decisive control.

SAF, which inherited structures, hierarchies, and organisational norms from the colonial period, has long been a dominant force in Sudanese politics. This historical trajectory has shaped the SAF’s enduring self-image as the guardian of the Sudanese state, entrenching its role in national politics and providing it with a formidable power base. Over time, with the model adopted from Egypt and its technical advice, the SAF expanded beyond its traditional military sphere, consolidating influence in the economy. Today, it controls a significant percentage of Sudan’s national economy through a controlling interest over numerous business enterprises, including, but not limited to, major financial institutions. All these provide SAF a power base to finance wars and dominate battles.

Citing its dominance over the national economy, its historical legacies, and its established military command structures, the conflict erupted in April 2023. Public opinion and media narratives favoured SAF. Analysts argued that these resources would enable the SAF to crush the RSF with relative ease, a view consistent with conventional realist military thinking. However, the war has defied these expectations. SAF’s historical significance and presumed superiority have been challenged. The war has challenged the power of S, unlike former President Omar al-Bashir’s attempt to curtail SAF’s political dominance and significance by cultivating rival security institutions, such as the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and elevating the Janjaweed militias into a formal paramilitary unit, the RSF, in 2013.

One of the most striking features of the conflict in Sudan is the erosion of power asymmetry between the warring parties. Despite its superior economic resources, control of the capital and national treasury, established command structures, and access to advanced technologies such as Unmanned Aerial VeVehicless/UA) and combat aircraft, SAF has struggled to secure swift, decisive victories against the RSF, a comparatively weaker adversary, at the onset of the war. This raises critical questions about the evolving dynamics of warfare in Sudan. As observed in other contemporary conflicts, such as the Russia–Ukraine war and the ongoing confrontation between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and Amhara Fano Forces in Ethiopia, where the latter was able to resist for three years and inflict significant damage on the national army, the balance of power between state militaries and paramilitary formations is increasingly fluid. In Sudan, this declining asymmetry between SAF and RSF has reshaped the trajectory of the war, with profound implications for its duration, outcome, and the conflict settlement options.

Founded on the empirical realities of the declining significance of power in closing the chapter on the conflict and on the possible utility of mediation and negotiation, this short article will examine the dynamics of declining power asymmetries between warring parties in Sudan and their possible implications.

During the initial phase of the conflict, SAF enjoyed a distinct advantage, drawing upon its established diplomatic networks, cohesive military command structures, and dominance over both the political sphere and the national economy. Its role as the de facto government of Sudan further reinforced this supremacy, enabling the SAF to consolidate authority domestically while cultivating strategic partnerships at both regional and continental levels. By contrast, RSF possessed only a narrow comparative advantage, relying primarily on surprise attacks and rapid manoeuvres. Over time, however, the balance began to shift. SAF gradually lost portions of its diplomatic leverage and proved unable to prevent the RSF from forging international and regional engagements. As the war has evolved, the SAF’s vast arsenal of conventional weaponry has proven insufficient to counter the RSF’s insurgent strategies or diminish its growing political and military significance in and beyond Sudan. The conflict has strained SAF’s logistical capacities, es and the expansion of battlefronts has overstretched its strength and drained its deployable forces. Capitalising on gold mining revenues in Western Sudan, RSF has invested heavily in a diverse range of military equipment, supplementing firearms seized from the SAF during battles. Complementing external assistance and other donated arms with internally generated resources, the RSF successfully diversified its financing mechanisms to sustain and expand its war effort. Once regarded as a minor threat at the outset of the war, the RSF has steadily grown in strength and technological sophistication. Subsequent inflows of substantial military and financial assistance from various actors and states to the RSF have significantly bolstered its military capacity and helped it reduce the initial imbalance of power. After nearly three years of conflict, it has established a relatively orthodox, state-like war economy, consolidated a centralised command structure, and emerged as a formidable contender for political and military dominance, significantly eroding SAF’s influence across political, economic, and military domains.

Although the RSF has not succeeded in eliminating the SAF or reclaiming all previously held territories, it has effectively narrowed the power gap by continuously adapting to the evolving dynamics of the war as they manifest in the way the HoA member countries engage with the conflict actors. The dominance of SAF and its control over the national capital prevented member states of the Horn of Africa from engaging with RSF during the initial stage of the conflict. However, as the war has endured, the RSF’s diplomatic leverage and influence within the Africa, HoA region, and transcontinental relations have significantly grown. With access to intelligence support, advanced artillery detection radars, anti-aircraft defence systems, and munitions acquired through both assistance and purchase, the RSF has boldly closed the gap with Sudan’s national military and improved its relative military and diplomatic strength, and adjusting itself to have a chance to obtain greater control of Sudanese politics. Over time, it has acquired improved weaponry and enhanced its command structures, thereby challenging SAF’s long-standing monopoly over advanced military technologies.

The current balance sheet of the conflict reveals that the SAF continue to maintain control over much of Sudan, having reclaimed the capital and several strategically significant military positions. Yet these territorial gains have come at the cost of unprecedented fatalities, underscoring the capacity of paramilitary forces to inflict substantial damage on a national army and thereby erode initial coercive asymmetries. Early assumptions of a rapid victory, minimal resistance, and a swift consolidation of political authority under SAF have proven increasingly unrealistic. As the war endures, the asymmetry between SAF and RSF continues to decline, producing a precarious balance of power in which neither actor can achieve decisive military and political dominance.

This equilibrium of weakness-cum-strength, compounded by external interference and fragmented mediation efforts, threatens to entrench Sudan in a protracted conflict that imposes disproportionate burdens on its population and destabilises the wider region. These dynamics highlight the absence of a purely military solution to Sudan’s political crisis and demonstrate the unreliability of military and technological superiority as predictors of war outcomes. The persistent erosion of power imbalances between the SAF and RS suggests that the conflict is unlikely to be resolved through battlefield victories.

In conclusion, the declining asymmetry of power and its implications for the duration of the conflict suggest that SAF may eventually accept mediation proposals it previously rejected, fearing such initiatives would confer political and diplomatic legitimacy upon the RSF. Thwar’s declining intensity compared to its earlier phases further reflects exhaustion on both sides and indicates a potential, albeit reluctant, openness to mediation as the only viable path to resolution. Therefore, Sudanese politics appears poised to enter a new phase characterised by the increasing representation and influence of civilian politicians, as the military establishment is immersed in a self-destructive phenomenon.

•Dr Yechale Degu currently serves as a Researcher at the Horn Centre for Democracy. A political economist by training, he is also an advisor on peacebuilding, transitional justice, and national dialogue, and has published a couple of recent articles on BRICS. Dr Degu worked with prominent CSOs and taught at Jig Jiga, Addis Ababa and Ambo universities.

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