INTRODUCTION

According to the learned authors of Black’s Law Dictionary, kidnapping is “the crime of seizing and taking away a person by force or fraud, often with a demand for ransom (also manstealing).” For Collins English Dictionary, to kidnap is “to carry off and hold (a person), usually for ransom.” This is corroborated by the learned authors of Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law as “the forcible abduction or stealing away of a person, whether a man, woman, or child. It is an offence punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment.” Morally speaking, it is wrong to steal anything, how much less a human being. In the ordinary course of events, the law frowns at the intent to take away something with the hope of depriving the owner thereof its permanent use. To kidnap a person therefore connotes that the kidnapper intends to deprive the victim of the use of his or her life, which is why the law places the offence of kidnapping in the same status as murder, with some statutes prescribing the maximum penalty of death. When a 98-year-old great grandmother is kidnapped, then there should be no remedy for the felon, because such a gruesome act borders on irredeemable depravity. There can be no justification for this heinous display of wickedness by the appellant and his gang, although I am well aware of the challenges faced by citizens in our present dispensation, especially the youth. No matter the difficulties that people face or contend with, it cannot ground the seizure or theft of an old woman, subjecting her to such a traumatic experience of keeping her in the trunk of a car, with all the inconveniences and dangers to her life and safety. But for the police and the act of divine intervention, the poor woman would most probably have died from exhaustion and suffocation even before the criminals got to their evil destination. I join the call upon the government to do more in job creation and youth empowerment, but the youth too must embrace contentment, diligence and believe in honest endeavours as the surest means of lasting prosperity and human survival, and stop chasing miracle money and exploring shortcut options to attain sudden wealth.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

The facts of this case are as reported in Abanobi v The State (2026) 5 NWLR (Pt.2037) 587. The appellant, acting in concert with his co-accused on 26th October 2014, kidnapped and took hostage one Madam Lydia Acho, a woman of 98 years old. She was purportedly abducted from her residence in Isuikwuato Local Government Area in Abia State. However, she was subsequently rescued on the same day within Ikuwano Local Government Area in Abia State following a car chase by the police. The appellant and the 2ndaccused person were later apprehended at the locus criminis with the appellant having sustained gunshot wounds. PW2, during her testimony, left the witness box to identify the appellant and the co-accused person in the dock. Under cross-examination, she stated that she was able to identify the appellant and his co-accused by the illumination from a flashlight. The police officer who led the patrol team that accosted the appellant and his co-marauders and rescued the victim testified as PW4. He gave evidence of how the appellant and the co-marauders were accosted by the patrol team while inside a Peugeot 406 wagon vehicle with which the victim was kidnapped. The driver of the vehicle lost control and rammed it into a tree and the occupants including the appellant ran into the surrounding bushes. The police shot at the occupants of the vehicle while they were trying to escape and noticed blood at the scene. Upon approaching the vehicle, the police rescued the victim from the boot of the vehicle and took her to the hospital. With the help of the community vigilantes, the appellant, with a bullet wound, and the 2ndaccused person were arrested from the bush. The appellant’s two phone handsets were recovered from the vehicle.

Following his apprehension, the appellant made a statement to the police, exhibit “B”, and was the sole witness in his defence. His story was that he too was kidnapped by the two passengers he carried in the Peugeot wagon on his way from his village in Anambra State to Aba. He admitted that he was in the vehicle with which the victim was kidnapped and taken away. He was there when the police led by PW4 accosted them, the vehicle rammed into a tree, the police shot at them and he bolted and ran inside the bush and slept there till the following morning for his safety. He further testified that on the following morning he came out from his purported concealment within the bush with the aim of reporting the incident of kidnapping at the police station. However, contrary to his alleged intention, he was instead apprehended by the police and subsequently charged with the very act of kidnapping he intended to report. He stated that he was released by the fleeing kidnappers amidst a barrage of gunfire, one of which hit him. However, in his extra-judicial statement, he claimed that he remained in the trunk of the car while one of the two alleged hijackers stood guard over him. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court in its judgment convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death for the offence of kidnapping contrary to section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking, Use of Offensive Weapons or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law No. 10 of Abia State, 2009. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed his appeal. Still dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court where he contended that the respondent failed to prove the offence charged as there was no evidence that he kidnapped the victim for the purpose of payment of ransom. In determining the appeal with final dismissal, the Supreme Court considered the provision of section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking, Use of Offensive Weapons or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law, No. 10 of Abia State, 2009 which states as follows:

“3(a) Any person who, for the purpose of payment of ransom, kidnaps and takes another hostage is guilty of an offence.”

What constitutes offence of kidnapping:

Section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking, Use of Offensive Weapons or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law No. 10 of Abia State, 2009 stipulates that any person who, for the purpose of payment of ransom, kidnaps and takes another person hostage is guilty of an offence. The section suggests an acknowledgment of the distinction between the offence of kidnapping as understood within broader legal jurisprudence and the specific instance contemplated under that legislation where the element of “for purposes of payment of ransom” is expressly incorporated as a necessary and constituent element for establishing guilt. The distinction is pertinent when considering the general principles governing the offence of kidnapping.

What Constitutes Offence of Kidnapping:

Section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Terrorism, Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking, Use of Offensive Weapons or Explosives and Other Threatening Behaviour Law No. 10 of Abia State, 2009 prescribes that the kidnapping and taking another hostage must have been actuated by the intention to ask for or for the purposes of payment of ransom. It does not provide that for the offence of kidnapping to be complete, the ransom must have been paid. It only prescribes manifestation of an intention by the abductor of demanding for or obtaining payment of ransom. What this postulates is that where the definition of kidnapping includes abduction for some specific purpose, the mens rea that the prosecution must prove in order to obtain a conviction must include the specific purpose. Therefore, it is not enough to prove that the defendant intended to abduct the victim. In order to secure a conviction of the defendant, the prosecution must prove that the defendant abducted the victim with the specific intention of obtaining payment of ransom. There must be an indication on the part of the defendant of trying to obtain an advantage or holding the victim for ransom. The prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to detain the alleged victim in order to demand and obtain a sum of money for the alleged victim’s release. It does not matter whether the defendant in fact demanded money or whether the defendant succeeded in obtaining any money. There must be some overt act manifesting that intention. In the instant case, it was clear that the intention of the appellant and his co-accused was to kidnap and take the victim for the purpose of payment of ransom. Contrary to the appellant’s submission, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal did not speculate on whether the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of ransom. The intention of the appellant and his co-accused person to demand ransom could be inferred from their conduct, given the overall circumstances of the case. The ingredients of the offence were established against the appellant.

The Probable Motivations for Kidnapping:

The jurisprudence of the offence of kidnapping extends beyond instances solely motivated by demand for payment of ransom. Criminals take hostages as a shield to help them escape from the scene of a crime. In addition, kidnapping could also be motivated by personal grudges.

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